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Report
Background 
The desire to codify and enumerate performance in the form of metrics has been a 
defining feature of the last two decades of public services governance. The study 
addresses questions related to the oversight of public services:   
1. Are parliamentarians as end-users completing a managerialist policy cycle, in 
which metrics derived oversight complements rationalist/calculative 
approaches to policy making and implementation elsewhere?   
2. Performance metrics are of significance for the democratic process, but what 
sort of instrumental purpose is behind their use by parliamentarians 
conducting oversight?   
3. Is use made by parliamentarians of extensive sets of performance metrics 
relating to public services, reversing a long term trend in the United Kingdom 
where power, in circumstances of increasing policy complexity, has been 
concentrated in the executive?  
The term ‘performance metrics’ refers to measures of performance, such as 
indicators, targets, ratios, league tables or benchmarks, which are used to assess 
and monitor health and community care services. Performance metrics are available 
to parliamentarians in many different forms including evaluations, annual reports, 
audits and budget-related performance information. There are in circulation over 
2000 performance metrics which relate to the NHS and community care activities.  
The extent to which elected representatives actually use performance metrics is little 
known. Explanations as to the institutional-behavioural dynamics informing 
performance metrics use by parliamentarians are more or less absent from the 
parliamentary studies literature. The public services literature includes a number of 
relevant studies, but is generally negative about the impact of performance metrics 
on oversight. Pollitt (2005) concluded that use of performance metrics is patchy and 
seldom highly valued by politicians. Van de Walle & Boivard  (2007) found little 
evidence of strong interest in metrics from politicians.  The review of empirical 
evidence conducted as part of the current study retrieved seven articles which met 
the twin search criteria of being concerned with oversight and having generated new 
empirical data on the use of performance metrics by elected representatives.1
The results reported in the seven studies are complex and only one study reported 
high use of performance metrics by elected representatives, the other researchers 
finding limited or low use. Scrutiny of the research designs used in these studies 
strongly indicated that a means of identifying tangible evidence of ‘use’ was of key 
importance. The importance of the ‘context’ of metrics use in oversight was also 
indicated in the literature, suggesting that policy and institutional circumstances were 
likely to feature heavily as factors influencing user behaviour. In terms of research 
design four important conclusions were drawn with respect to the current study. 
Firstly the study should focus on a parliamentary committee with a clearly defined 
membership and for which a reliable record of meetings was available. Secondly the 
study should avoid reliance on self-reporting of use by parliamentarians, either in 
questionnaires or interviews, since for various reasons this is liable to be inaccurate 
                                                 
1 ESRC Public Services programme DP0809 
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and suffer from disappointing response rates. Instead content analysis of transcripts 
should be used to provide data. Interviews should be conducted with selected 
subjects after an account of user behaviour had been established. Thirdly the study 
must be longitudinal if it is intended to analyse the context in which use takes place. 
Lastly the content analysis must employ classifications of use which are as near 
universal as possible, if a comparative study is to be designed on the basis of the 
current study.  
 
Objectives
The study was designed to address a detailed set of questions related to user 
behaviour summarized below as follows.  
Objective A: When do MSPs use metrics? 
1. Determine the discursive and transactional context of use.  
2. Determine the transactional context of use 
3. Are metrics used on a regularized basis?  
4. Do MSPs have ‘favourite’ metrics?  
5. Is use associated with media coverage of an issue? 
6. Enumerate usage.  
Objective B: Who uses metrics?  
1. Who employed performance reference?  
2. Determine associations between use of metrics and MSP characteristics.  
Objective C: What types of metric are used? 
1. Categorise the source, form and subject matter metrics used.  
2. Are ‘consumer choice’ metrics favoured?  
Objective D: Why do MSPs use metrics?
1. Discover the extent of usage in relation to constituency matters?  
2.  Are metrics used in extra parliamentary discursive forums and referred to in 
Committee business?  
3. Is there evidence of partisan party political positions formed on the basis of 
metrics?  
4. Do political parties have distinctive purposes in using metrics?
5. Identify purposes, e.g. supporting an argument, as the basis for question, 
opportunistic as ‘political ammunition’?  
Objective E: How are metrics used? 
1. Does ‘discursive’ deliberation’ take place around metrics?  
2. Are metrics employed in ‘transactional’ work such as the scrutiny of a bill?  
3. Are metrics used as part of a policy ‘jigsaw’ or considered on their own 
terms?
Objective F: To what effect? 
1. Are there metrics informed decisions or other outputs for example reports.  
2. Identify evidence of an enlightenment effect related to the use of metrics over 
the years 1999-2007?
See results section for evidence relating to objectives A1 – F2.  
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Methods
The study involved a content analysis of official records of the Scottish Parliament 
Health and Community Care Committee (hereafter referred to as the ‘Committee’) 
meetings and a series of in-depth elite actor interviews. The Scottish Parliament 
keeps a verbatim transcript of all committee meetings unless the item under 
consideration is deemed to be best discussed in private. In reality very few private 
sessions are held. Following a preliminary examination of the meetings held in 1999 
and 2000 in which alternatives were trialed, a classification scheme was established 
to record data relating to the uses of performance metrics observed.  
The study was conceived around an inclusive definition of ‘use’. By this it is meant 
that any occasion when a Committee member made an intervention which referred to 
a performance metric would be recorded as a use. A more prescriptive approach 
might only have recorded precise references to data contained in named sets of 
metrics. This it is felt would fail to take account of the different purposes which 
parliamentarians have in using performance metrics. The mark-up process was 
conducted manually, there being no discernable means of identifying key words 
which would accurately identify uses of performance metrics. Basic software tools for 
searching the marked up/coded transcripts have proved to be valuable in subsequent 
analysis.
The examples given below illustrate the terms employed in categorizing usage. 
(Purpose of metrics related intervention, the witness to which the question was 
directed, the type of metric employed (input/output/outcome) and the source of the 
metric).
Firstly a record was kept of occasions when a Committee member made a minuted 
intervention on the basis of a figure derived from a specific set of metrics: 
Question to a witness from Scottish Executive Health Department:  
‘I am really asking how you know that the target is achievable if the current 
audits are prospective and will not be evaluated until 2005. You have set a 
target that ‘the maximum wait from urgent referral to treatment for all cancer 
cases is no more than 2 months by 2005’? (Session 2 2003. Output metric. 
Source: Government) 
A record was also kept of uses which made reference to a set of metrics but did not 
actually quote a specific number, percentage or ranking:  
Question to a doctor representing an oncology research centre:  
‘We talked to patient representatives this morning who were passionate about 
the unacceptable waiting times that people have to endure before they get 
access to a scanner and about the tremendous pressure on consultants’. 
(Session 1 2002. Output metric. Source: Government) 
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Where a member made a request for a set of metrics relating to an issue under 
discussion a record was kept:  
Question to Minister for Health: 
‘ …. so I will ask what measurements there are in relation to the budget to 
demonstrate that the Arbuthnott policy is effective and that you are getting the 
outcomes that were projected when you chose to implement the policy’. 
(Session 2 2003. Outcome metric. Source: Government)  
Members often challenged the basis of performance metrics under discussion in 
meetings, for example when a government minister addressed the committee or 
when a report was under review: 
Question to a Chair of a health board: 
‘Under community planning, different organizations will measure different 
things. I worry that, because there is no guidance, every association will have 
different headings. Bodies may pick out whatever has been positive and has 
had good outcomes, in order to produce a glossy document. I would like to 
think that community planning would have a substantial positive effect, but I 
cannot get a grip on what we are measuring and how we are doing that’. 
(Session 1 2002. Outcomes metrics. Source: Community Planning 
Partnership -health boards and local authorities).
Lastly a record was kept of occasions when a member asked for an explanation to be 
provided on the basis upon which a performance metric was collected or presented:  
Question to witness from Scottish Association for Mental Health:  
‘Did you want to test the accuracy of the figure of 50 per cent that is used by 
Dr Coia? (The clinical effectiveness of neurosurgery for mental disorder NMD) 
(Session 2 2002. Outcome metric: Source: Government/evidence based 
medicine literature review) 
Having established ‘case law on what constituted a use of performance metrics, the 
marked up reports of committee meetings have been re-examined to verify the 
inclusion of each separate instance of use in the scores kept.2
In-depth interviews with current and past members of the Committee, explored key 
factors influencing user behaviour. Interviews were conducted on the basis of 
knowledge of the member’s user history. Interviews were also conducted with 
officials in the Scottish Parliament, House of Commons and Welsh Assembly, audit 
agency staff and civil servants in an effort gain a sense of perspective. In total twelve 
Committee members, seven parliament/assembly officers, two audit agency officials, 
two civil servants and two interest group officers were interviewed.  
Results
                                                 
2 A third PSP Discussion Paper (in preparation) provides a full account of criteria for inclusion.   
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The findings are based on a content analysis of official reports of 232 Committee 
meetings which took place between the years 1999-2007 and interviews. The 
Committee had a total of 28 members between the commencement of Session One 
in May 1999 and the completion of Session 2 in May 2007. The Committee initially 
had ten members and a convener, subsequently reduced to seven members, a 
convener and deputy convener in 2003. The Convener during Session 1 was a 
nominee of the Liberal Democrats, the junior partner in the governing coalition. 
Labour as the largest group in the Parliament nominated five members in 1999 which 
was reduced to four in 2003. The next biggest party in the Parliament, the Scottish 
Nationalists nominated three members, reduced to two in 2003. The Conservatives 
were initially allocated two places on the Committee, reduced to one in 2003. The 
Committee’s party membership structure continued on the same basis in Session 2, 
but with an SNP convener throughout. An independent member (a GP standing on a 
stop hospital closures platform) was also part of the Committee in Session 2. 
Individual use examined 
The length of Committee membership ranged from the entire four years of the 
relevant session to a matter of a few weeks. This presented a problem in comparing 
members’ propensity to use performance metrics. Between1999-2007, there were 28 
members of the Committee, with an average tenure of 77 meetings or slightly over 
two years.  In a bid to provide a balanced account of user behaviour use of metrics 
has been calculated on a ‘per-meeting’ basis. Table 1 records the user record of all 
28 members.  
In Session 1 there were 431 recorded uses of performance metrics in 119 Committee 
meetings. The figure fell to 210 over the course of 113 meetings in Session 2. The 
data shows that the range of use by members per-meeting is high. Five members 
averaged less than 0.1 uses per meeting, while two members averaged between .9 
and 1 uses per meeting. The inclination and/or capacity to use metrics in meetings 
are therefore highly varied. During Session 1, the average use of metrics by 16 
members was .37 per meeting. In Session 2 the Committee had 12 members and 
average use fell to just .21 per meeting. The highest users were a Conservative and 
a Labour member who both sat on the Committee during Session 1. In attempting to 
understand individual user behaviour in more detail the data was examined to identify 
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any associations between use per meetings rates and factors such as political party, 
pre-parliamentary career background and length of Committee membership. (A6) 
Tables 2&3 record use of metrics on a per meeting basis, identifying members 
according to political party and also providing the average use by members of each 
political party represented on the Committee. (B1&B2).
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Political parties 
Associations between political party and user behaviour were sought, it appearing 
logical to anticipate that Committee members who belonged to the political parties in 
the coalition government might take a less critical approach to oversight than 
opposition party Committee members.  In Session 1 Labour members averaged .31 
uses of metrics per meeting and the Liberal Democrat member averaged .49 uses 
per meeting. The Conservatives averaged .54 uses per meeting, which does support 
the ‘taking it easy on your own minister’ hypothesis. However, the largest opposition 
party the SNP averaged only .28 uses of metrics per meeting, which refutes the 
hypothesised association. In Session 2 the hypothesis seems to hold up rather 
better, with Labour members averaging only .16 uses of metrics per meeting and the 
Liberal Democrats only marginally better at .17. The Conservatives averaged .33 and 
the SNP average use remaining at .28, seemingly supporting an association between 
party and user behaviour along the lines forecasted. (D4) 
Interviews with members confirmed the influence of partisan tactics in the use 
performance metrics in Committee, but also raised parliamentary experience as a 
factor influencing use. Only a handful of MSPs had experience of policy oversight 
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gained as former MPs, when they are elected to the Scottish Parliament. It is seems 
likely that inexperienced parliamentarians went through a learning process in which 
they worked out how to ‘best’ operate as a Committee member. What passes for an 
effective contribution does not necessarily require evidence in the form of 
performance metrics. Two of the Labour members whose use fell below the Labour 
average of .33 per meeting, went on to hold ministerial positions in the Health 
Department during Session 1, strengthening the conclusion that career minded 
government members avoid using metrics. One of these low scoring Committee 
members had previous experience as an MP. The decline in use of metrics by the 
Committee in Session 2 refutes any notion of a general ‘enlightenment effect’ through 
members’ use of metrics. (F2) 
Interviews indicated that the political parties do not differ very much in the resources 
they provide to Committee members through research departments. On the other 
hand those in the Labour Party might have been expected to have a certain degree 
of ‘back door access’ to the research and information services of the Health 
Department led by their ministerial office holding party colleagues. If this was the 
case then no evidence appears in the form of higher use of performance metrics. 
Pre-parliamentary background 
It is reasonable to assume that a prior knowledge of health and community care 
services would have some positive influence on the capacity and perhaps inclination 
to use metrics. Members’ pre-parliament careerswere identified. Out of the 28 
members, three had experience as medical practitioners. The former medical doctors 
averaged .39 uses per meeting, but this ranged from 0.05 to .90 per meeting, 
indicating that inclination and capacity to use metrics cannot be predicted by a  
medical background. One former medical practitioner indicated in an interview that 
the study of performance metrics featured heavily in their working life as a 
parliamentarian, while another freely admitted that they did not ‘dig’ very far in 
looking for evidence on performance. The list of members also included  nurses, a 
pharmacist, a social worker and two community care managers. In total 11 out of 28 
members had experience of the health or community care sectors. In Session 1 the 
‘experienced’ members averaged .38 uses per meeting as against .32 by members 
with no health or community care career experience. In Session 2  experienced 
members averaged.23 uses per meeting compared to .21 by members with no 
experience. The conclusion is drawn that there is no association between levels of 
use and experience. (Objective B2) 
Of the 28 members of the Committee, 22 had attended university. The six members 
who had no higher education averaged .19 uses per meeting as opposed to an 
average of .32 for the university educated. There is therefore a strong possibility that 
inclination and capacity to use performance metrics is positively linked to education.  
Length of membership 
Another possible explanation for the wide range in use of metrics is related to tenure, 
which ranged from 26 to 119 meetings. Over the two sessions examined, 17 of the 
28 MSPs were members of the Committee for over two years. It might be anticipated 
that long periods of membership would allow members to learn about health policy 
and how to use performance metrics. In Session 1 this proved to be the case with the 
MSPs who were members for over two years averaging .4 uses of performance 
metrics and MSPs whose membership lasted less than two only averaging  .27 uses 
of performance metrics. However this association was not repeated in Session 2 
when the MSPs who were members for over two years averaged .19 uses of 
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performance metrics as opposed to an average .27 uses by those MSPs who were 
members for less than two years. There is no evidence therefore that length of tenure 
affects inclincation and or capacity to use performance metrics in Committee.  
Trends and patterns of use 
The 232 meetings examined produced data which demonstrated that the 
performance metrics referred to in each of the 641 recorded uses, were mostly 
produced by the Health Department of the Scottish Government. Performance 
metrics produced by bodies such NHS Quality Improvement Scotland and Audit 
Scotland were also used. Interventions which involved the use of performance 
metrics were mostly directed at government ministers, civil servants or NHS senior 
managers. Other witnesses such as representatives of the doctors (BMA and royal 
colleges), academics and interest group leaders, also frequently responded to 
questions which were based around metrics. (A1& A5) The Committee also 
frequently discussed metrics between themselves in parts of meetings when no 
witnesses were appearing. (E1) The content analysis captured the type of metric 
used in the sense of whether they referred to inputs, outputs or outcomes. However 
because of multiple references by different Committee members to the same set of 
metrics recorded, a further analytic exercise will need to be conducted in order to 
draw balanced conclusions as to the respective popularity of different types of metric. 
This is also true in relation to metrics producers. (A1) Apart from annual budget 
meetings there were no regularized scrutiny events in which a predictable set of 
metrics would be used in Committee business. (A3, E3) With the exception of those 
members who are recorded as high users there is little evidence of MSPs returning to 
the same sets of metrics on a regular basis. The same conclusion is drawn with 
respect to metrics which have been used in extra-parliamentary discursive forums 
which members may have taken part in. (D2).  The subject matter which provides 
seems to prompt use is wide ranging. The instance of members making an 
intervention which relates to their constituencies is low. (D1) On a number of 
occasions an issue like the widely media reported prospect of a flu epidemic, 
appears to encourage use of metrics. (A5). Consumer choice related metrics such as 
this relating to referrals do not appear to have attracted particular interest. (C2) 
In Session 1 2003 no metrics based interventions were made at all and data from 
Session 2 confirms the decreasing incidence of use. Any impact in terms of 
increased inclination to employ performance metrics, resulting from declining 
information search cost, enhanced Committee knowledge management or increased 
individual understanding of performance issues, appears to be outweighed by other 
factors. The longitudinal research design allowed an appreciation of context to be 
built up. It is apparent on inspection of the agenda followed by the Committee that it’s 
dual role as legislative and oversight body creates a conflict over the time allocated 
to respective roles. During Session 1 seven bills were dealt with, including three 
where Health and Community care was acting as lead scrutiny committee. The 
Committee also dealt with four budget bills. Notably during 2003 Session I the 
Committee dealt with the Primary Medical Services (Scotland) Bill over the course of 
many sessions. During Session 2 thirteen bills were considered, including nine where 
Health and Community care acted as lead committee. Four budget bills were also 
considered. In 2006 a great deal of Committee time was taken up with the Adult 
Support and Protection (Scotland) Bill. The evidence suggests that the Committee is 
normally unable to sustain performance metrics based oversight when processing 
legislation. (A2 &E2) 
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The content analysis differentiated between different contexts of use. Firstly when a 
parliamentarian uses a performance metric to make a point it is of significance in 
suggesting that a line of evidence based reasoning is at work. Table 4. breaks this 
type of use down into occasions when specific data were referred to and times when 
a set of metrics was referred but no actual data. Initially in Session 1, usage rates are 
fairly steady ranging between 44 and 58 (1999 figures adjusted); however this 
pattern came to an abrupt halt thereafter and with the exception of 2004 a decline set 
in, suggesting a deteriorating capacity or inclination to use metrics.  
Table 4. Incidence of metrics based interventions in Committee meetings. 
Session 1 Metrics based 
interventions
Reference to 
specific data
No reference to 
specific data 
1999 29 13 16
2000 50 23 27
2001 55 33 22
2002 44 20 24
2003 0 0 0
Total 178 89 89
Session 2 Metrics based 
interventions
Reference to 
specific data
No reference to 
specific data 
2003 2 1 1
2004 45 22 23
2005 21 12 9
2006 13 7 6
2007 9 5 4
Total 90 47 43
Asking for sets of metrics to be provided is an important action in that it can identify 
parliamentarians as acknowledging that they lack sufficient evidence to address the 
issue in hand. The 1999 figure of five requests (Table 5.) probably reflect the novelty 
of tasks associated with the new parliament, with members needing time to orientate 
themselves to the task of oversight. In 2000 a total of 17 requests were made for 
information. In 2001 the number of requests was again 17. It is important to 
investigate the context in which requests for metrics were being made. The annual 
budget scrutiny process mainly took place during three meetings, which alone 
generated nine requests for metrics. In 2001, scrutiny of the budget process 
accounted for six of the 17 recorded requests for sets of metrics to be provided. 
However from 2004 onwards the inclination to ‘ask for more’ was in decline.  
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Table 5. Requests by Committee members for performance metrics to be provided. 
Session 1 Ask for metrics to be provided in 
relation to a policy issue  
1999 5
2000 17
2001 17
2002 10
2003 0
Total 49
Session 2 Ask for metrics to be provided in 
relation to a policy issue  
2003 12
2004 11
2005 8
2006 7
2007 5
Total 43
The data collected on challenges to and requests for explanations of the basis 
metrics, shows remarkably high levels of activity.  During Session 1 a total of 204 
challenges and requests for explanations were made as against 178 metrics based 
interventions and correspondingly in Session 2 some 77 challenges and requests for 
explanation were made compared with 90 metrics based interventions. (Table 6.) 
Examined in context it is clear that challenges and demands for explanations are 
usually a means of expressing a lack of trust in the performance story being 
delivered by government. Expressing doubts about the integrity of performance 
metrics seems to be seen by members as a useful means of demonstrating 
effectiveness in their oversight role. In spite of being in a minority on the Committee, 
103 of the 204 challenges and demands for explanation came from non-government 
party members of the Committee in Session 1 and 47 of the 77 challenges and 
explanations in Session2, came from SNP members. Interviews supported the 
conclusion that challenging and asking for explanations is as one interviewee put ‘all 
about embarrassing the government’. (D3, D4 & D5) 
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Table 6. Challenges to basis of metrics provided, demands for explanation and 
claims of inaccessibility. 
Performance concepts and perspectives adopted by parliamentarians 
Session 1 Challenge basis 
of metrics 
Ask for 
explanation/ or 
claim inaccessible
Total
1999 17 29 46
2000 13 30 43
2001 26 35 61
2002 10 44 54
2003 0 0 0
Total 66 138 204
Session 2 Challenge basis 
of metrics 
Ask for 
explanation/ or 
claim metrics 
inaccessible
Total
2003 2 11 13
2004 6 24 30
2005 10 7 17
2006 1 3 4
2007 2 11 13
Total 21 56 77
The Committee does not discuss specific sets of performance metrics as a separate 
agenda item and crucially does not routinely examine reports from either NHS 
Quality Improvement Scotland or Audit Scotland. (E3) Instead the Parliament’s Audit 
Committee is obliged to examine their reports. Rules state that the Audit Committee 
can refer reports on to a policy committee, but in practice this seldom happens. Only 
two high user members were able to demonstrate that they consistently accessed 
reports emanating from audit agencies or sets of metrics produced annually by the 
Department for Health to raise issues in Committee. Most members had no clear 
‘favourite’ sources of metrics. (A4) Metrics are frequently employed in Committee 
reports although caution must be exercised due to the practice of advisers drafting 
such documents and hence choosing metrics for inclusion. (F1) 
Parliamentarians tended to adopt three basic positions in relation to metrics in the act 
of oversight. There are times when members behave as if they accept the conditions 
on which data is collected, analysed and presented. As users they make an 
intervention in which the performance story expressed in sets of metrics is taken at 
face value. On the other hand parliamentarians may demonstrate through their use of 
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metrics that they are still comfortable with the reporting system, but want more 
metrics to add to the completeness of the performance story. Alternately 
parliamentarians do not accept the legitimacy of the performance metrics produced 
by government and the NHS; instead they position themselves as ‘disbelievers’ and 
use references to performance metrics to develop a discourse of doubt. The 
parliamentarians examined did not align exclusively with one position instead they 
will generally adopt any of the three positions when it suits.  
The study endorsed the decision to employ a context sensitive, longitudinal approach 
to data gathering which did not rely on self-reported claims by parliamentarians 
regarding use. Articles to be written in 2009 will further develop the analytic scheme 
set out in basic terms in DP0810,3 which makes reference to institutional, economic, 
cognitive and knowledge management factors influencing user behaviour. The basic 
processes used in the study are replicable in a comparative study.  
In respect of the three questions posed above (background) the following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
4. Some high user parliamentarians are clearly completing a managerialist 
policy cycle, in which their metrics informed approach to oversight matches 
the rationalist/calculative approaches increasingly referred to in policy making 
and implementation. They represent the minority.  
5. Performance metrics are a resource for use in the democratic process, but 
the instrumental purpose behind their use by parliamentarians is often highly 
partisan in character.  
6. The use of metrics by parliamentarians relating to public services is unlikely to 
reverse the long term trend where power, in circumstances of policy 
complexity is concentrated in the executive.  
For use of metrics to make a greater impact institutional and organizational changes 
would be required. For instance a statutory requirement for the Committee to review 
the reports prepared by NHS Quality Improvement Scotland and Audit Scotland. 
There is also a strong case for organizing training in the use of performance metrics 
for MSPs joining the Committee. Institutional and knowledge management reform will 
be discussed in the report that is sent to users.  
Activities
Marnoch, G. (2008). An exploratory study of parliamentarians and their use of 
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Marnoch, G. (2008). Concepts of performance employed in parliamentary oversight. 
A study of members of the Scottish Parliament Committee1999-2007. EGPA Annual 
Conference Study Group on Performance in the Public Sector (pp. 1-34). Erasmus, 
Rotterdam: EGPA. 
Marnoch, G. (2008). Politics by numbers? Understanding the use made of 
performance metrics by parliamentarians - a report on provisional findings. ECPR
Joint Sessions Workshop on Evidence Based Policy Making (pp. 1-34). Rennes: 
ECPR.
Marnoch, G. (2008). The performance metrics boom, parliamentary scrutiny and 
evaluation. (pp. 1-21). Lisbon: European Evaluation Society. 
                                                 
3 Public Services Programme DP 0810 
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Marnoch, G. (2008). DP0810: A review of empirical research on politicians' behaviour 
as end-users of performance metrics.
 
 
Outputs
Report for users to be published mid-February.  
Impacts
It is hoped that study will influence the development of the Scottish parliament as an 
institution and that findings will be of interest to audit agencies in their engagement 
with parliamentarians.
Future Research Priorities 
An immediate target is to design a comparative study on parliamentarians and their 
use of performance metrics. This will afford an opportunity to exploit the lessons 
learnt in content analysis and conceptualization of user behaviour. Discussions are 
taking place with colleagues in Belgium, New Zealand and Canada.  
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